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For lawyers and judges dealing with challenges to the validity of administrative deci­
sions on a daily basis, the question of the standard of review to be employed by the 
court in evaluating the matter before it has become the starting point from which the 
rest of the case must proceed. Nowadays it is virtually impossible to contemplate a 
judicial review application on a matter of substance without counsel, and the court 
itself, attempting to come to grips with the choice and application of the appropriate 
standard of review.1
To say that the Supreme Court of Canada’s standard of review jurisprudence 
has been the matter of some controversy among administrative law practitioners and 
lower court judges would be an understatement.2 Indeed, open dissatisfaction with 
this jurisprudence has been expressed by members of the Court itself, most notably 
by Mr. Justice LeBel in Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 793 and Voice Construction
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Ltd. v. Construction & General Workers’ Union, Local 92.4 It is equally evident, 
however, that for the time being the Court as a whole is wedded to the “pragmatic 
and functional” standard of review analysis set out in Pushpanathan v. Canada 
(Minister o f Citizenship and Immigration)5 and elaborated on in subsequent deci­
sions. Whether or not this line of thinking represents an ideal solution for the stan­
dard of review problems that lawyers and judges have to address, it seems to me that, 
at least for the short to medium term, it is the framework that our legal system is com­
mitted to using. What I would like to do in this essay is explore why the Supreme 
Court of Canada has found this framework attractive, and suggest some ways of 
understanding the framework that will, I hope, make it easier for lawyers and judges 
to use.
My basic thesis is that more attention needs to be paid to the implications that 
the outcome of the standard of review analysis holds for the types of arguments that 
lawyers make on judicial review applications and the reasons that judges give to sup­
port their decisions. If the “correctness”, “reasonableness” and “patently unreason­
able” standards are merely labels that have little real impact on the types of argu­
ments that lawyers use to support their positions or the reasoning that judges use in 
accepting or rejecting these arguments, much of the value that is supposed to attach 
to the standard of review analysis required by Pushpanathan is wasted. I am not con­
vinced that the current state of the law is quite so grim as this observation might sug­
gest. On the other hand, I do contend that it is important for the courts to begin draw­
ing distinctions in kind and not merely in degree concerning the types of arguments 
that are appropriate to use in addressing cases that involve each of the recognized 
standards of review. To adopt the language employed by Mr. Justice LeBel in Toronto 
(City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, it is essential to develop approaches to the standards of 
review that make them “analytically, rather than merely semantically, distinct.”6
I will pursue this line of argument in three parts. The first is a relatively 
straight-forward description of the Pushpanathan standard of review framework 
itself, as it has been explained and elaborated upon in subsequent Supreme Court of 
Canada decisions. The second is a discussion of the considerations that in my view 
drove the Supreme Court of Canada to favour this framework. In the third part of the 
essay I will explore a number of techniques for understanding what seems to me to 
be the crucial element of the Pushpanathan framework, namely how to differentiate 
what lawyers and judges ought to be doing in employing the three distinct standards 
of review.
4 Supra note 1.
5 [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 [“Pushpananthan”].
6 Supra note 3, at para. 103.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FRAMEWORK
The current framework for assessing the standard of review to be employed in 
reviewing administrative decisions was laid out by Mr. Justice Bastarache writing for 
the Supreme Court of Canada majority in Pushpanathan. The first step is for the 
reviewing court to go through a four-part “pragmatic and functional analysis” to 
determine the appropriate standard of review to be applied in relation to any partic­
ular issue in the case. This analysis is necessary whether the matter is before the court 
by way of an application for judicial review or by way of appeal, and for the sake of 
convenience I will use the term “review” to cover both types of proceedings. The 
reviewing court is required to weigh four different factors in order to discern the stan­
dard of review it should employ in addressing each relevant element of the adminis­
trative body’s decision. These factors are: (1) the presence or absence of a privative 
clause or a right of appeal; (2) the relative expertise of the decision-maker and the 
reviewing court; (3) the general purpose of the legislation authorizing the decision, 
and the purpose of any particular statutory provision that is at issue; and (4) the 
nature of the problem being addressed by the decision-maker.7 The factors are to be 
weighed in an effort to determine “the legislative intent of the statute creating the tri­
bunal whose decision is being reviewed.”8 That having been said, the Supreme Court 
of Canada has also indicated recently that “the pragmatic and functional approach 
inquires into legislative intent, but does so against the backdrop of the courts’ con­
stitutional duty to protect the rule of law.”9 Thus, the fact that the legislature has 
enacted a privative clause restricting the scope of judicial review or, on the other 
hand, granted a statutory right of appeal from a tribunal’s decision does not displace 
the necessity of conducting a pragmatic and functional analysis.10 Likewise, the fact 
that the parties to the proceeding have agreed that a particular standard of review 
ought to be employed is not determinative, and the court must itself evaluate the four 
factors in order to determine the proper standard.11
We know from the Court’s decision in Baker v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship) 12 that the four-part standard of review analysis must be undertaken 
whenever a litigant is seeking to challenge the exercise of discretion by an adminis­
7 Supra note 5, at parass. 26-38.
8 Ibid., at para. 26. See also Keddy v. New Brunswick (Workplace Health, Safety & Compensation 
Commission)-, 2002 NBCA 24, 42 Admin. L.R. (3d) 161 (N.B.C.A.), at paras. 28-29.
9 Dr. Q. v. College o f  Physicians and Surgeons o f British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003 SCC 
19, at para. 21 [ “Dr. Q. ”].
10 Ibid., at paras. 20-25.
11 Monsanto Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent o f Financial Services), 2004 SCC 54, at para. 6.
12 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.
trative decision-maker, as well as in situations where the challenge is based on an 
alleged misinterpretation by an administrative body of the law governing its deci­
sions.13 In Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, Mr. Justice LeBel 
expressed misgivings concerning the expansion of the Pushpanathan framework 
from its original home in the administrative tribunal arena into other areas such as 
review of the decisions of municipal councils and school boards.14 Despite this con­
cern the Supreme Court of Canada continues to employ the same four-part test with­
out a great deal of critical thought concerning its appropriateness in different settings.
One of the criticisms that has been made of standard of review jurisprudence 
in the past is that the Supreme Court of Canada has been content to move in new 
directions without expressly repudiating approaches that have been taken in the 
past.15 The following observation made by Chief Justice McLachlin in the Dr. Q. 
case would appear to lay to rest any lingering doubts about the primacy of the “prag­
matic and functional approach” over more traditional approaches to judicial review:
To determine standard of review on the pragmatic and functional approach, it is 
not enough for a reviewing court to interpret an isolated statutory provision relat­
ing to judicial review. Nor is it sufficient merely to identify a categorical or nom­
inate error, such as bad faith, error on collateral or preliminary matters, ulterior 
or improper purpose, no evidence, or the consideration of an irrelevant factor. 
Rather, the pragmatic and functional approach calls upon the court to weigh a 
series of factors in an effort to discern whether a particular issue before the 
administrative body should receive exacting review by a court, undergo “signif­
icant searching or testing” (Southam, supra, at para. 57), or be left to the near 
exclusive determination of the decision-maker. These various postures of defer­
ence correspond, respectively, to the standards of correctness, reasonableness 
simpliciter, and patent unreasonableness.
13 This approach has been followed in numerous other Supreme Court of Canada decisions reviewing 
the exercise of discretion, including Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd. [2000] 1 S.C.R. 342; 
Trinity Western University v. British Columbia (College o f  Teachers), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, 2001 SCC 
31; Committee fo r  the Equal Treatment o f Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities 
Commission), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132, 2001 SCC 37; Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec 
(Minister o f Health and Social Services), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281, 2001 SCC 41; Suresh v. Canada 
(Minister o f Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1 \Ahani v. Canada (Minister 
o f Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 72, 2002 SCC 2; Chieu v. Canada (Minister o f  
Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, 2002 SCC 3; Chamberlain v. Surrey School 
District No. 36, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710, 2002 SCC 86 [“Chamberlain”]; and C.U.P.E. v. Ontario 
(Minister o f  Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, 2003 SCC 39. It is necessary when addressing alleged errors 
in fact-finding as well. Dr. Q., supra note 9, at paras 33-39.
14 Chamberlain, ibid., at paras. 190-205.
15 See, for example, J. Evans, “Jurisdictional Review in the Supreme Court: Realism, Romance and 
Recidivism” (1991), 48 Admin. L.R. 255; A. Roman, “The Pendulum Swings Back” (1991), 48 Admin. 
L.R. 255; B. Langille, “Judicial Review, Judicial Revisionism and Judicial Responsibility” (1986), 17 
Rev. Gen. De Droit 169.
Much as the principled approach to hearsay articulated in R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 
S.C.R. 531, and R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915, eclipsed the traditional cate­
gorical exceptions to the hearsay rule (/?. v. Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, 2000 
SCC 40), the pragmatic and functional approach represents a principled concep­
tual model which the Court has used consistently in judicial review.
Just as the categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule may converge with the 
result reached by the Smith analysis, the categorical and nominate approaches to 
judicial review may conform to the result of a pragmatic and functional analy­
sis. For this reason, the wisdom of past administrative law jurisprudence need 
not be wholly discarded. For example, in Baker v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, L’Heureux-Dubé J. invoked 
the old Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948]
1 K.B. 223 (C.A.), categorical approach to discretionary decisions as a reflection 
that ministerial decisions have classically been afforded a high degree of defer­
ence (see also Suresh v. Canada (Minister o f Citizenship and Immigration),
[2002], 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1, at paras. 29-30), but acknowledged that the 
principled approach must now prevail. Similarly, as Binnie J. recognized in 
Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services),
[2001] 2 S.C.R. 281, 2001 SCC 41, at para. 54, that under the pragmatic and 
functional approach, even “the review for abuse of discretion may in principle 
range from correctness through unreasonableness to patent unreasonableness”.
The nominate grounds, language of jurisdiction, and ossified interpretations of 
statutory formulae, while still useful as familiar landmarks, no longer dictate the 
journey.16
In Professor David Mullan’s words, the Pushpanathan approach has become “an 
overarching or unifying theory for review of the substantive decisions of all manner 
of statutory and prerogative decision makers”.17
A number of questions spring to mind as one contemplates the first stage of the 
Pushpanathan test, including how a reviewing court is to establish the relative 
weight of these factors and how the court is to address the concept of relative expert­
ise.18 At the end of the day, however, it seems to me that the aspect of the 
Pushpanathan framework that is the greatest source of concern to litigants and their 
lawyers is the possibility that what appear to be similar factors will be weighed dif­
ferently in different cases. For example, in Trinity Western University v. British 
Columbia (College of Teachers) the fact that the College’s decision had implications 
for the delicate balance between constitutionally protected interests in freedom of
16 Dr. Q., supra note 9, at paras. 22-24.
17 D. Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at p. 108, quoted with approval in Dr. 
Q., supra note 9, at para. 25.
religion and equality significantly influenced the majority’s conclusion that the cor­
rectness standard of review was appropriate.19 In Moreau-Bérubé v. New Brunswick 
(Judicial Council), on the other hand, the fact that the Judicial Council was required 
to address the balance between the constitutional protected interest in judicial inde­
pendence and judicial accountability did not prevent the Court from concluding that 
the Council’s decision should be reviewed using the “patently unreasonable” stan­
dard.20 The concern that emerges when one confronts decisions like these that are 
difficult to reconcile is that it is easy for the litigants to go away with the impression 
that the standard of review analysis is influenced more by the reviewing court’s 
eagerness or reluctance to intervene in a particular case than by a principled account 
of the proper relationship between the courts and the administrative body whose 
decision is under review. No doubt as courts gain more experience with the use of the 
four-part Pushpanathan analysis these issues will be addressed more fully. For pur­
poses of this paper, however, I want to concentrate on what happens once a court 
arrives at a particular standard of review. The utility of the first stage of the 
Pushpanathan analysis, determining which standard of review to apply, depends 
largely on what significance this determination holds for the way the reviewing court 
is supposed to approach the substance of the dispute the parties have brought before 
it. In my view this aspect of the analytical framework has received less attention than 
it deserves.
For some time after Pushpanathan was decided there existed some doubt con­
cerning the range of possible outcomes that could flow from the “pragmatic and 
functional” analysis. The Supreme Court of Canada itself had always employed one 
of three standards of review: (1) the “correctness” standard; (2) the “patently unrea­
sonable” standard originally described in C.U.P.E., Local 963 v. New Brunswick 
Liquor Corp.,2' or (3) the intermediate “reasonableness” standard pioneered in 
Canada (Director o f Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.22 Some lower 
courts, on the other hand, had seized on the suggestion found in decisions such as 
Southam23 and Pushpanathan24 that there existed a “spectrum” of standards of 
review. These courts had explored alternative possibilities, including such standards
18 For an extremely insightful discussion of the “relative expertise” concept, see R. Hawkins, 
“Reputational Review I: Expertise, Bias and Delay” (1998), 21 Dal. L.J. 5.
19 Supra note 13, especially at paras. 17-19.
20 [2002] 1 S.C.R. 249, 2002 SCC 11, especially at paras. 43-53.
21 [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227 [“New Brunswick Liquor”].
22 [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748 [“Southam"].
23 Ibid., at para. 30.
24 Supra note 5, at para. 27.
as “correctness with appropriate deference”25 and a standard that lay somewhere 
between reasonableness simpliciter and the “patently unreasonable” standard.26 As 
a result of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Law Society o f New 
Brunswick v. Ryan27 and Dr. Q. v. College o f Physicians and Surgeons o f British 
Columbia,28 we now know that the “pragmatic and functional” analysis must yield a 
choice among one of the three standards currently recognized by the Supreme Court 
of Canada.
The “correctness” standard has traditionally been easy to describe and apply 
since it permits the reviewing court to make an independent assessment of the issue 
in dispute and substitute its own view for the one taken by the administrative body if 
that appears to the court to be appropriate. The difference between the “reasonable­
ness” standard and the “patently unreasonable” standard was described by Mr. 
Justice Iacobucci in Southam in the following terms:
. . . An unreasonable decision is one that, in the main, is not supported by any 
reasons that can stand up to a somewhat probing examination. Accordingly, a 
court reviewing a conclusion on the reasonableness standard must look to see 
whether any reasons support it. The defect, if there is one, could presumably be 
in the evidentiary foundation itself or in the logical process by which conclu­
sions are sought to be drawn from it. An example of the former kind of defect 
would be an assumption that had no basis in the evidence, or that was contrary 
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. An example of the latter kind of 
defect would be a contradiction in the premises or an invalid inference.
The difference between “unreasonable” and “patently unreasonable” lies in the 
immediacy or obviousness of the defect. If the defect is apparent on the face of 
the tribunal’s reasons, then the tribunal’s decision is patently unreasonable. But 
if it takes some significant searching or testing to find the defect, then the deci­
sion is unreasonable but not patently unreasonable.29
This description of the distinction between the two tests was reinforced by Mr. 
Justice Iacobucci, writing for the Court, in Ryan30 and he has defended this approach
25 See Northwood Inc. v. British Columbia (Forest Practices Board), [2001] B.C.J. 365 (C.A.) at paras.
35 — 38 commented upon in D. Lovett, Northwood Inc. v. British Columbia (Forest Practices Board): 
Deference Within a Standard of Correctness?” (2001), 59 The Advocate 701.
26 See British Columbia (Vegetable Marketing Commission) v. Washington Potato and Onion 
Association , [1997] F.C.J. 1543 (C.A.) at para. 3.
v  [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 2003 SCC 20, at paras. 24-26 [“flyan”].
28 Supra note 9, at para. 35.
29 Southam, supra note 22, at paras. 56-57.
30 Supra note 27, at para. 24.
in his extra-judicial writing as well.31 As I noted at the outset of this paper, it seems 
to me that a great deal hangs on the ability of lower courts to apply this distinction 
effectively, and I will address this issue in more detail later in the paper.
It might appear from the Voice Construction decision that the Supreme Court 
of Canada is moving indirectly towards a “two standards” approach to judicial 
review by curtailing the application of the “patently unreasonable” standard. In that 
case the decision of a labour arbitrator protected by a weak privative clause was 
reviewed using the “reasonableness” standard rather than the “patently unreason­
able” standard, even though the general trend of the jurisprudence in the labour arbi­
tration field suggested that the “patently unreasonable” standard should be applied. 
My own view is that Voice Construction is best understood as a sign that the Supreme 
Court of Canada expects reviewing courts to inquire closely into the circumstances 
of the case before them in carrying out the standard of review analysis, and that it is 
not sufficient to rely on superficial analogies with earlier decisions in selecting the 
appropriate standard. As the Doucet Jones case illustrates, the presence of a strong­
ly worded privative clause continues to be a persuasive indicator that review using 
the “patently unreasonable” standard is appropriate. Voice Construction may be taken 
as a harbinger of a greater willingness of the Supreme Court of Canada to select the 
“reasonableness” standard over the “patently unreasonable” standard than it has 
exhibited in the past, but I believe that it is still too early to predict the demise of the 
“three standards” approach to judicial review.
B. THE REASONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE “PRAGMATIC 
AND FUNCTIONAL” STANDARD OF REVIEW FRAMEWORK
On the face of it, the framework I have just described appears a bit complicated, 
though perhaps given the Supreme Court’s ambition to set out a unifying theory of 
substantive judicial review it could fairly be said that a certain amount of complexi­
ty is inevitable.32 What is less obvious is how this particular choice of a unifying the­
31 The Honourable Mr. Justice F. Iacobucci, “Articulating a Rational Standard of Review Doctrine: A 
Tribute to John Willis” (2002), 27 Queen’s L.J. 860.
32 As Mr. Justice Iacobucci puts it, ibid. at pp. 872-873: “. . .  the spectrum [of standards of review] was 
an inevitable consequence of the adoption of the pragmatic and functional approach. It is questionable 
whether we need to sacrifice this more nuanced legal framework, which generates superior adminis­
trative law results merely for the sake of an often misguided search for simplicity. While simplicity is 
a virtue in the modern regulatory state, Parliament and the legislatures have delegated numerous pow­
ers in myriad ways, and have made various choices about how this delegated power should be super­
vised. There is no reason why the courts should willfully disregard these complexities in order to make 
their supervisory role easier. Having access to multiple standards of review across the full range of the 
deference spectrum allows courts to deal with these complexities in a sophisticated and, arguably, a 
more effective and practical way.”
ory emerged,33 and what purposes it is designed to serve.
In my view it is helpful to begin by recognizing that any system of judicial 
oversight, whether it is appellate review of the decisions of trial judges or judicial 
review of the decisions of administrative bodies, is concerned with two things. The 
first is establishing an appropriate relationship between the initial decision-maker 
and the court that is carrying out at supervisory function.34 It is, of course, theoreti­
cally possible for a reviewing court to engage in a de novo consideration of all the 
evidence and issues that were before the initial decision-maker. Our legal system 
generally takes the view that this is wasteful of time and resources, however, so we 
normally want a reviewing or appellate court to play a more limited supervisory role.
The second thing we want a review system to do is advance the cause of jus­
tice between or among the parties to the dispute that is before the court. If oversight 
is a mere pro forma exercise, the time and money of the litigants are being wasted 
and the administration of justice is brought into disrepute. In an ideal world, all the 
parties to a judicial review or appeal proceeding would be reinforced in their belief 
that the court’s intervention led to a just result regardless of whether the outcome was 
favourable to them. More realistically, we expect the court to be able to convince the 
losers that their arguments were heard and given serious consideration, even if they 
were found wanting.
It should be evident immediately that the goal of adopting an appropriate insti­
tutional relationship can conflict with the goal of doing justice in the case before the 
court. This can happen if litigants find themselves in a position where the reviewing 
judge believes that justice is on their side but it would be institutionally inappropri­
ate for the judge to interfere with a key aspect of the initial decision-maker’s ruling. 
All systems of oversight confront this possibility, and they all struggle to achieve an 
appropriate resolution of it.
At the risk of over-simplification, it seems to me that if one looks back to the 
era prior to the New Brunswick Liquor case, the law of judicial review in Canada was 
preoccupied with the division of spheres of authority between administrative deci­
sion-makers and courts. The courts assumed that administrative bodies had a “right 
to be wrong” as long as they were operating within the scope of their authority, espe­
33 For a discussion of the historical development of the “pragmatic and functional” framework and an 
analysis of the framework that is much more detailed and sophisticated than it is possible for me to 
offer in this brief paper, I can recommend S. Comtois, Vers la primauté de l ’approche pragmatique et 
fonctionnelle, Précis du contrôle judiciaire des decisions de fond rendues p a r les organisms admini- 
tratifs (Cowansville, Quebec: Editions Yvon Biais, 2003) and D. Jones and A. de Villars, Principles o f  
Administrative Law (4th ed. Scarborough, Ontario: Thompson Canada Ltd., 2004) at pp. 456-482.
34 For a very useful discussion of this aspect of judicial review, see F. Falzon, supra, note 2.
cially if their decisions were protected by a privative clause.35 The courts also 
assumed that they were in the best position to supply “correct” answers to the legal 
questions that confronted administrative bodies. The challenge for counsel seeking to 
overturn an administrative decision on judicial review, therefore, was to convince the 
court that the administrative body had overstepped the bounds of its jurisdiction or 
made some other type of legal error that the court had the authority to correct.
This is not to say that review using a “reasonableness” standard had no place 
in Canadian administrative law prior to the New Brunswick Liquor decision. For 
example, in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation 
Lord Greene, M.R. observed that the courts would intervene where an administrative 
body did “something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay 
within the powers of the authority” 36 or came to “a conclusion so unreasonable that 
no reasonable authority could ever have come to it.”37 It is apparent, however, that 
the Wednesbury unreasonableness standard was more a means of demonstrating to a 
court that a public body had exceeded its authority than a basis for persuading the 
court to overturn unreasonable decisions. Moreover, the application of the standard 
was sufficiently stringent that reliance on the Wednesbury case came to be seen as 
something akin to an argument borne of desperation.38 As a result, counsel tended 
to prefer to frame legal challenges to the exercise of discretion in terms of other doc­
trines such as the ultra vires principle,39 unauthorized sub-delegation,40 fettering of 
discretion,41 acting for improper purposes,42 taking into account irrelevant consider­
35 See, for example, Walker v. Manitoba (Labour Relations Board), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 78; Service 
Em ployees’ International Union, Local 333 v. Nipawin Union Hospital, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 382; F.A. 
Sawatsky Ltd. v. Manitoba (Labour Board) (1972), 24 D.L.R. (3d) 220 (Man. C.A.); Parkhill Furniture 
& Bedding Ltd. v. I.M.A.W. Local 714 (1961), 26 D.L.R. (2d) 589 (Man. C.A.).
36 [1948] 1 K.B. 223 (Eng. C.A.) at p. 229.
37 Ibid. at p. 234.
38 It is, of course, possible to find decisions in which Canadian courts have accepted an argument that 
administrative action was unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. See, for example, Canadian National 
Railway Co. v. Fraser-Fort George (Regional District) (1996) 26 B.C.L.R. (3d) 81, 140 D.L.R. (4th)
23 (B.C.C.A.); Re Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags Antiebolag and Nova Scotia Woodlot Owners’ 
Association (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 91, 61 D.L.R. (3d) 97 (N.S.C.A.). In my view, however, such cases 
are sufficiently unusual that they can be treated fairly as the exceptions that prove the rule.
39 See Mia v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission) (1985), 61 B.C.L.R. 273, 17 D.L.R. 
(4th) 385 (B.C.S.C.).
40 See Vic Restaurant Inc. v. Montreal, [1959] 1 S.C.R. 58.
41 See Maple Lodge Farms v. Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2; Ainsley Finance Corp. v. Ontario (Securities 
Commission) (1994), 21 O.R. (3d) 104, 121 D.L.R. (4th) 79 (Ont. C.A.).
42 See Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121.
ations 43 or failure to take into account relevant considerations.44
Wherever possible, however, counsel who sought to overturn an administrative 
body’s decision devoted their ingenuity to the transformation of issues that might 
have been characterized as questions of fact or law or the exercise of discretion into 
questions that went to the administrative body’s jurisdiction. Questions going to 
jurisdiction were clearly on the judicial side of the authority boundary and there was 
little doubt that courts would require administrative bodies to answer questions that 
went to their jurisdiction “correctly”.45 This approach was capable of producing a 
highly interventionist approach to judicial review, as the House of Lords demon­
strated when it developed the “wrong question” doctrine in the Anisminic case46 in 
1969, a development that the Supreme Court of Canada enthusiastically embraced in 
the Metropolitan Life case47 the following year. The way the “wrong question” doc­
trine worked is that the court would split the issue before the tribunal into two parts, 
a preliminary legal question typically involving some aspect of the administrative 
body’s statutory mandate and the application of the governing law to the facts of the 
case itself. If the court disagreed with the tribunal’s approach to the legal question, it 
could say that the tribunal had “embark[ed] on an inquiry or answer a question not 
remitted to it”48 and therefore exceeded its jurisdiction. Thus, any dispute concem-
43 See Re Multi-Malls Inc. and Minister o f  Transportation and Communications (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 
49, 73 D.L.R. (3d) 18 (Ont. C.A.); Doctors Hospital v. Ontario (M inister o f Health) (1976), 12 O.R. 
(2d) 164 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
44 See Oakwood Development Ltd. v. St. Francois Xavier (Rural Minicipality), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 164; 
Bareham v. London (City) Board o f  Education (1984), 46 O.R. (2d) 795, 10 D.L.R. (4th) 406 (Ont. 
C.A.).
45 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada in Pushpanathan did not challenge the proposition that juris­
dictional questions must be answered “correctly”. Instead, it challenges the way in which we identify 
questions as jurisdictional. Thus, at para. 28, Mr. Justice Bastarache observed: . . it is still appropri­
ate and helpful to speak of “jurisdictional questions” which must be answered correctly by the tribunal 
in order to be acting intra vires. But it should be understood that a question which “goes to jurisdic­
tion” is simply descriptive of a provision for which the proper standard of review is correctness, based 
upon the outcome of the pragmatic and functional analysis. In other words, “jurisdictional error” is 
simply an error on an issue with respect to which, according to the outcome of the pragmatic and func­
tional analysis, the tribunal must make a correct interpretation and to which no deference will be 
shown.”
46 Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147 (H.L.E.). Indeed, in Re 
Racal Communications Ltd., [1981] A.C. 374 (H.L.E.) and O ’Reilly v. Mackman, [1983] 2 A.C. 237 
(H.L.E.), Lord Diplock appeared to take the view that the Anisminic decision had effectively trans­
formed all questions of law into questions of jurisdiction. See the discussion of these cases by Cory, J., 
dissenting, in Canada (Attorney General) v. Public Service Alliance o f Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 614, 
at pp. 644-647.
47 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. I.U.O.E., Local 796, [1970] 2 S.C.R. 425.
48 New Brunswick Liquor, supra note 21, at [1979] 2 S.C.R. p. 237, quoting S.E.I.U. v. Nipawin Union 
Hospital, supra note 35, at [1975] 1 S.C.R. p. 389.
ing the interpretation of a statute could, with sufficient ingenuity, be transformed into 
a question going to the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
In my view, the New Brunswick Liquor decision had three effects on this line 
of thinking. The first was to dampen judicial enthusiasm for the characterization of 
questions of statutory interpretation as jurisdictional and therefore subject to review 
using a “correctness” test. While the Supreme Court of Canada did not immediately 
abandon the idea that some interpretive questions went to a tribunal’s jurisdiction, 
there is little doubt that the range of statutory interpretation questions that would be 
subjected to judicial scrutiny using the “correctness” standard was significantly cur­
tailed.49
The second effect of Mr. Justice Dickson’s judgment was to introduce the 
“patently unreasonable” standard of review as a comprehensive basis for judicial 
intervention regardless of whether the statutory provision whose interpretation was 
in dispute would be properly characterized as jurisdictional. As a result, the Court 
was able to embrace the view, implicit in Anisminic, that administrative bodies 
should not receive absolutely immunity from judicial review in relation to any ele­
ment of their decisions. At the same time, however, the Court was able to avoid a 
commitment to review all aspects of administrative decisions using a correctness 
standard.
The third important part of the New Brunswick Liquor decision was Mr. Justice 
Dickson’s suggestion that many statutory provisions were inherently ambiguous and 
that an administrative tribunal’s interpretation of those provisions might actually be 
superior to the interpretations that might appeal to judges. It seems to me that the 
effect of this point was to pave the way for an alternative reason for deference to 
administrative decision-making, namely a rationale based on expertise rather than 
authority. This shift in thinking did not happen overnight. During the 1980s and into 
the early 1990s a number of Supreme Court of Canada decisions reinforced the idea 
that the New Brunswick Liquor case did not abolish the category of issues that went
49 For example, in S.E.P.Q.A. v. Canada Labour Relations Board, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 412, [ “S.E.P.Q.A. ”] 
Mr. Justice Beetz, at p. 420, generally limited jurisdictional errors to those that relate: “to a provision 
which confers jurisdiction, that is, one which describes, lists and limits the powers of an administrative 
tribunal, or which is [TRANSLATION] “intended to circumscribe the authority” of that tribunal, as 
Pigeon J. said in Komo Const, v. Comm, des relations du travail du Québec, [1968] S.C.R. 172 at 175,
68 C.L.L.C. 14,108 (sub nom. Komo Const, v. Que. L.R.B), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 125 (S.C.C.).” At p. 421 he 
criticized the use of the “preliminary or collateral” questions doctrine as “a fleeting and vague concept 
against which the Courts were warned by this Court in N.B. Liquor Corp., supra at p. 233, once the 
initial jurisdiction of the administrative body holding the hearing has been established at the outset.” 
The restrictions on the use of the “correctness” standard have expanded in recent years, to the point 
where questions that were once considered jurisdictional in nature are no longer characterized in that 
manner. See Ivanhoe Inc. v. U.F.C.W., Local 500, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 566, 2001 SCC 47; Sept-îles (City) 
v. Quebec (Labour Court), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 670, 2001 SCC 48.
to a tribunal’s jurisdiction and had to be decided “correctly”.50 More recently, how­
ever, the Court has been much less willing to take a categorical approach to questions 
that once were categorized as jurisdictional, and lower courts have begun to take note 
of this alteration in the Court’s thinking. In Neighbouring Rights Collective of 
Canada (NRCC) v. Society o f Composers, Authors and Music Publishers o f Canada 
(SOCAN)51 the Federal Court of Appeal rejected an argument that the Copyright 
Board’s interpretation of its remedial powers went to the Board’s jurisdiction and the 
Board therefore had to interpret those provisions “correctly”. Mr. Justice Evans 
observed:
. . .  [A] lot of water has gone under the judicial review bridge since Beetz J. for­
mulated the test in [S.E.P.QA.] for determining which provisions of an enabling 
statute an administrative agency must interpret correctly if its decision is to with­
stand judicial review for jurisdictional error when protected by a strong preclu­
sive clause. See, for example, Professional Assn. of Foreign Service Officers v.
Canada (Attorney General), 2003 FCA 162 (Fed. C.A.) at para. 11 (per Strayer 
J.A.).
That a statutory provision comfortably seems to fit the description of one that 
“describes, lists and limits the powers of an administrative tribunal” is no longer 
conclusive of the standard of review, even when the scope of a tribunal’s reme­
dial powers is at issue. For the following reasons, resort to the language of juris­
diction as used in [S.E.P.Q.A.] no longer enables a reviewing court to avoid a 
pragmatic and functional analysis in order to determine the standard of review.
. . .  In my view, there is a logical incompatibility between a pragmatic and func­
tional analysis for determining the appropriate standard of review, and a formal­
istic approach that purports to identify certain statutory provisions as attracting 
correctness review because they describe, define or limit the powers of an 
administrative agency. The fact of the matter is that every statutory provision 
that prescribes the circumstances that must exist, or be taken into account, before 
an agency decides a matter or takes some action can be said to describe, define 
or limit its powers.
• • •
. . .  [T]o the extent that the Supreme Court of Canada continues to have regard 
to a statutory provision’s “jurisdictional” nature in the [S.E.P.Q.A.] sense when
50 See, for example, S.E.P.Q.A., ibid.; U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048; Canada 
(A.G.) v. P.S.A.C., supra note 46; Canadian Pacific Airlines v. Canadian Air Line Pilots Ass'n, [1993]
3 S.C.R. 724; and Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 
157.
51 2003 FC 302, 2003 CarswellNat 2137, 229 D.L.R. (4th) 205 (F.C.A.).
determining the standard of review, it is only as one part of one factor of the 
pragmatic and functional analysis, namely the nature of the problem before the 
agency: Chieu v. Canada (Minister o f Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1 
S.C.R. 84 (S.C.C.) at paras. 22 and 24.
Taking into account both the relative expertise of the Board and the Court, and 
the nature of the problem before it, I have concluded that the Board is better 
placed than the Court to determine if its powers include the certification of a sin­
gle tariff when the parties have neither submitted, nor consented to one.
Accordingly, the relative expertise of the agency and the reviewing court on the 
issue in dispute, often described as the most important factor in the pragmatic 
and functional analysis (see, for example, Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment & Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 (S.C.C.) at paras. 32-33), 
indicates a legislative intention that the Court should exercise considerable 
restraint in reviewing the Board’s decision to certify a single tariff.
Mr. Justice Evans’ reasons do not suggest that courts will never use the “correctness” 
standard of review in addressing questions that were once characterized as jurisdic­
tional. What they do indicate is that courts are required to undertake a more careful 
analysis of when a particular issue ought to be regarded as going to the jurisdiction 
of an administrative body.52
As the SOCAN decision suggests, the trend in the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
more recent administrative law decisions has been to concentrate less on the division 
of authority between administrative bodies and courts and more on the issue of which 
institution ought to have the final say with respect to the different aspects of the prob­
lem the administrative body was confronting.53 According to this line of thinking, 
judicial intervention in administrative decision-making ought to vary depending on 
the likelihood that the courts will actually improve the overall quality of decisions by 
taking a more interventionist stance.54 This commitment to judicial deference does 
not mean that courts should abandon their supervisory role. They should, however, 
intervene only if the nature of the administrative body or the types of decisions it
52 For instance, in my view there are still compelling reasons for a court to use the correctness standard 
in reviewing decisions that require a tribunal to interpret the relationship between its own enabling leg­
islation and that of another tribunal. See, for example, Canada (A.G.) v. P.S.A.C., supra note 46 and 
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), supra note 50.
53 Among the decisions that are the most significant in the development of this trend I would include 
Bell Canada v. Canada (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission), [1989] 1 
S.C.R. 1722; National Corn Growers Association v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324; 
Dayco (Canada) Ltd. v. CAW-Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 230; Pezim  v. British Columbia (Superintendent 
of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557; and Southam, supra note 22.
54 See H.W. MacLauchlan, “Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretations of Law: How Much 
Formalism Can We Reasonably Bear?” (1986), 36 U.T.L.J. 313.
made suggested that close judicial supervision was appropriate,55 or where the 
administrative body’s decision was sufficiently erroneous that it warranted judicial 
intervention regardless of a general posture of deference.56
The New Brunswick Liquor case itself involved judicial review of a tribunal 
whose decisions were protected by a strong privative clause. Accordingly it was pos­
sible to explain the Court’s approach to deference in terms of traditional legislative­
ly imposed limits on the scope of judicial authority to review the tribunal’s decisions. 
Indeed, one of the early criticisms of Mr. Justice Dickson’s reasons for judgment in 
the New Brunswick Liquor case was that he offered two quite distinct rationales for 
the Court’s unwillingness to intervene in the tribunal’s decision without commenting 
on the possibility that these rationales might be in conflict.57 One obvious source of 
conflict was that deference based on authority tended to produce binary solutions 
(either the courts had authority to intervene or they did not) whereas deference based 
on relative expertise admitted of the possibility of different gradations or degrees of 
deference.
Once deference based on relative expertise took hold, however, it was obvious 
that it would not be restricted to situations where the administrative body’s decisions 
were protected by a privative clause. It was hardly surprising, therefore, to find the 
Supreme Court of Canada searching for an intermediate approach that would allow 
it to offer some deference based on the expertise of a tribunal and at the same time 
recognize that some tribunals were not entitled to the same degree of deference as 
others whose decisions were protected by privative clauses. As Mr. Justice Iacobucci 
pointed out in Southam, the logic of the jurisprudence required an intermediate stan­
dard of review. He observed:
I wish to emphasize that the need to find a middle ground in cases like this one 
is almost a necessary consequence of our standard-of-review jurisprudence. 
Because appeal lies by statutory right from the Tribunal’s decisions on questions 
of mixed law and fact, the reviewing court need not confine itself to the search 
for errors that are patently unreasonable. The standard of patent unreasonable­
ness is principally a jurisdictional test and, as I have said, the statutory right of 
appeal puts the jurisdictional question to rest. See Canadian Union o f Public 
Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227, at
55 See, for example, Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554; Gould v. Yukon Order 
o f Pioneers, 1996] 1 S.C.R. 571.
56 See, for example, Toronto (City) Board o f Education v. O.S.S.T.F. District 15, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 487; 
United Association o f Journeymen and Apprentices o f  the Pipefitting Industry v. W.W. Lester (1978) 
Ltd., [1990] 3 S.C.R. 644 [ “Lester"].
57 N. Lyon, “Case Comment” (1980), 58 Can. Bar Rev. 646.
p. 237. But on the other hand, appeal from a decision of an expert tribunal is not 
exactly like [an] appeal from a decision of a trial court. Presumably if Parliament 
entrusts a certain matter to a tribunal and not (initially at least) to the courts, it is 
because the tribunal enjoys some advantage that judges do not. For that reason 
alone, review of the decision of a tribunal should often be on a standard more 
deferential than correctness. Accordingly, a third standard is needed.58
While an intermediate standard of review is attractive from the standpoint of devel­
oping a relatively sophisticated framework for organizing the relationship between 
courts and administrative decision-makers, it is less clear how the thought process of 
a judge employing the reasonableness standard can be differentiated from the thought 
process of the same judge employing the “patently unreasonable” standard. As noted 
above, in the Southam case Mr. Justice Iacobucci tried to address this question by 
concentrating on the “immediacy or obviousness of the defect”.59 This approach 
tends to overlook the Supreme Court of Canada’s earlier efforts to give content to the 
“patently unreasonable” standard of review, and the inconsistencies that can be iden­
tified in these efforts.
The Supreme Court of Canada originally sought to define the “patently unrea­
sonable” standard as something that was distinct from the “correctness” standard 
used to review “jurisdictional” questions. Mr. Justice Dickson, as he then was, can 
be credited with the first definition in the New Brunswick Liquor decision itself. He 
asked: “was the Board’s interpretation so patently unreasonable that its construction 
cannot be rationally supported by the relevant legislation and demands intervention 
by the court upon review?”60 This test, which was concerned principally with alleged 
errors by tribunals in the interpretation of their governing statutes, asked reviewing 
courts to consider whether or not the interpretation chosen by the tribunal was one 
that the legislation could reasonably bear.61 If so, the court was to refrain from inter­
fering with the tribunal’s decision.
In S.E.P.Q.A. v, Canada (Labour Relations Board),62 however, Mr. Justice 
Beetz put a quite different gloss on the “patently unreasonable” standard of review. 
He observed that “a mere error of law is to be distinguished from one resulting from 
a patently unreasonable interpretation of a provision which an administrative tribu­
nal is required to apply within the limits of its jurisdiction. This kind of error amounts
58 Southam, supra note 22, at para. 55.
59 Supra note 29.
60 New Brunswick Liquor, supra note 21, at [1979] 2 S.C.R. p. 237.
61 See MacLauchlan, supra note 54.
62 Supra note 49.
to a fraud on the law or a deliberate refusal to comply with it.”63 The Dickson for­
mulation appears to contemplate judicial correction of serious errors of interpretation 
that are made in good faith whereas the Beetz formulation appears to imply that 
“patently unreasonable” interpretations will only surface where the tribunal is acting 
in bad faith.
While the “fraud on the law” approach never took hold, later definitions con­
tinued to emphasize the judicial obligation not to be excessively interventionist. In 
the Paccar case, for example, Mr. Justice La Forest wrote: “The courts must be care­
ful to focus their inquiry on the existence of a rational basis for the decision of the 
tribunal, and not on their agreement with it. The emphasis should not be so much on 
what result the tribunal has arrived at, but on how the tribunal arrived at that 
result.”64 This emphasis on rationality was later reinforced by Cory, J., writing for 
the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Public 
Service Alliance o f Canada, who observed:
It is said that it is difficult to know what “patently unreasonable” means. What 
is patently unreasonable to one judge may be eminently reasonable to another.
Yet any test can only be defined by words, the building blocks of all reasons. 
Obviously, the patently unreasonable test sets a high standard of review. In the 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary “patently”, an adverb, is defined as “openly, 
evidently, clearly”. “Unreasonable” is defined as “[n]ot having the faculty of rea­
son; irrational. . . . Not acting in accordance with reason or good sense”. Thus, 
based on the dictionary definition of the words “patently unreasonable”, it is 
apparent that if the decision the Board reached, acting within its jurisdiction, is 
not clearly irrational, that is to say evidently not in accordance with reason, then 
it cannot be said that there was a loss of jurisdiction. This is clearly a very strict 
test.65
These formulations of the “patently unreasonable” test were undoubtedly quite effec­
tive in discouraging excessive judicial intervention in administrative decision-mak- 
ing. They were not, however, particularly useful as indicators of when courts ought 
to intervene. Moreover, when judges do decide that an administrative decision is suf­
ficiently seriously wrong that it requires intervention, this approach forces them into 
the unfortunate rhetorical position of having to characterize the decision as “clearly 
irrational” when it would be more accurate to say that the judges believe there are
«  Ibid., at [1984] 2 S.C.R. p. 420.
64 C.A.I.M.A.W. v. Paccar o f Can. Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 983, at para. 32 [“Paccar”].
65 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941, at p. 963-964.
compelling reasons for refusing to allow the decision to stand. As Mr. Justice 
Robertson observed in New Brunswick (Board o f Management) v. Doucet Jones:66
. . .  [F]formulating a review standard in terms of a decision being absurd or clear­
ly irrational does little to advance the interests of justice. In truth, such standards 
unnecessarily demean the individual whose personal judgment is called into 
question by the unsuccessful party. No decision-maker wants to be labeled 
“clearly irrational” or the author of a “silly” decision.”
In the next part of this essay I will argue that if one examines judgments in which 
courts have determined that administrative decisions are “patently unreasonable” it 
is possible to construct a series of rationales for judicial intervention that are both 
more useful and more convincing than the alternatives described above. This is, I 
would argue, precisely what the New Brunswick Court of Appeal did in Doucet 
Jones and the elaboration of this approach holds out the potential for more satisfac­
tory use of the current three-standard approach to judicial review.
C. REFINING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF “CORRECTNESS” 
“REASONABLENESS” AND “PATENTLY UNREASONABLE” REVIEW
Before turning to the question of how we ought to understand the “patently unrea­
sonable” standard of review, it is worth spending a moment to explore the distinction 
between the “correctness” and the “reasonableness” standards. Former Alberta Court 
of Appeal Justice Roger Kerans, in his book Standards o f Review Employed by 
Appellate Courts, expressed the following view on the subject:
There are only two true standards of review. The first asks whether the appellate 
court agrees with the first tribunal, and requires it to make its own decision. It is 
de novo except in the sense that it begins by study of the decision of the first 
judge, and therefore might be called the standard of “concurrence”. The second 
presumes that the decision of the first judge was correct, and demands of the 
appellant that it persuade the reviewing court that the decision was wrong in the 
sense of not being one that a sensible and responsible person could have made 
in the circumstances of the case. The court can and should dismiss the appeal 
without making or offering its own decision on the case if the appellant fails in 
that burden. If the court does interfere, it must be able to articulate cogent rea­
sons for labeling the first decision as unreasonable.67
66 Supra note 2, at para. 23.
67 The Honourable Mr. Justice R. Kerans, Standards o f  Review Employed by Appellate Courts 
(Edmonton: Juriliber Ltd., 1994), at p. 51. It is noteworthy that Mr. Justice Kerans, who was writing 
before the Southam case had been decided, does not find it useful to distinguish between “reasonable­
ness” review and the “patently unreasonable” standard identified in the New Brunswick Liquor case. 
While I have some sympathy with this approach, current Canadian jurisprudence forces us to attempt 
to give meaning to the distinction between these two standards.
Whether or not one agrees with the initial observation that there are only two 
“true” standards of review, it seems to me that two aspects of this line of reasoning 
are particularly noteworthy. The first is that both approaches to the standard of 
review question are consistent with what Professor David Dyzenhaus has described 
as “deference as respect”, which he defines as “[requiring] not submission but a 
respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a 
decision. . . “,68 The “correctness” approach advocated by Mr. Justice Kerans still 
requires a reviewing court to begin by giving careful study to the decision under 
review. No doubt it is easy to find examples of judicial failure to give respectful con­
sideration to the reasons for which administrative bodies reach the decisions they do. 
In my view, however, it should not automatically be taken as a sign of disrespect 
when a judge comes to a different conclusion than an administrative body. In 
essence, what the “correctness” standard means is that the courts are entitled to the 
final say on particular questions, whether it be the interpretation of the constitution 
or the interpretation of a particular statute. It is easy to find disagreement about how 
broad or narrow the ambit of this particular aspect of the judicial role ought to be. 
Nevertheless, I believe it is a mistake to conclude that the choice of the “correctness” 
standard of review somehow undermines or belittles the significance of the role 
played administrative bodies whose decisions are subject to review using this stan­
dard.
The second important aspect of Mr. Justice Kerans’ description of the difference 
between the “correctness” and the “reasonableness” standard of review is that he 
offers a distinction in kind rather than merely one of degree. In other words, he is 
describing two distinctly different thought processes and, I would submit, distinctly 
different lines of argument need to be advanced in order to persuade a court to inter­
vene using these two standards. As a result it seems to me that, with the greatest of 
respect, Mr. Justice Sopinka was wrong to insist in his concurring judgment in the 
Paccar case that “Anyany adjudication upon the reasonableness of a decision must 
involve an evaluation of the merits.69 In Mr. Justice Sopinka’s view:
Reasonableness is not a quality that exists in isolation. When a court says that a 
decision under review is “reasonable” or “patently unreasonable” it is making a 
statement about the logical relationship between the grounds of the decision and 
premises thought by the court to be true. Without the reference point of an opin­
ion (if not a conclusion) on the merits, such a relative statement cannot be 
made.70
68 D. Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in M. Taggart, ed., The 
Province o f Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) 279, at p. 286, quoted with approval 
in Baker, supra note 12, at para. 65.
69 Paccar, supra note 64, at p. 1018.
In my opinion, Mr. Justice Kerans (in the passage quoted above) and Mr. 
Justice La Forest in the Paccar case correctly concluded that a court using a “rea­
sonableness” standard should not be attempting to draw a comparison between what 
it thinks is right and the decision under review. I say this for two reasons. The first is 
that it runs counter to the proposition that, as long as the administrative body has not 
behaved unreasonably its decision is authoritative. In the eyes of the law, therefore, 
no meaningful distinction can be drawn between a reasonable decision and one that 
is correct since they are both treated in the same way. The second, and more impor­
tant, reason is that one of the central purposes of law is to reconcile the unsuccessful 
litigant to the justice of defeat. It seems to me that for a reviewing court to tell the 
unsuccessful litigant that its argument was correct but that for institutional reasons 
the court is not going to intervene is likely to inflame rather than diminish that liti­
gant’s sense of injustice.
Although it is possible to draw a relatively distinct line between “reasonable­
ness” review and “correctness” review, how can we create a similarly sharp bound­
ary between reasonableness review and review using the “patently unreasonable” 
standard? I suspect that we can never draw quite as clear a distinction between these 
two standards because “patently unreasonable” decisions will always be a subset of 
unreasonable decisions. That said, it seems to me that we can identify types of 
flaws that are characteristic of “patently unreasonable” decisions and require litigants 
to use arguments based on these flaws in cases where the “patently unreasonable” 
standard is being employed rather than simply advancing the proposition that the 
decision is seriously wrong or obviously incorrect.
First of all, in those rare cases where counsel is able to argue successfully that 
a decision was made in bad faith, it seems to me that this automatically makes the 
decision itself not merely wrong or unreasonable but “patently unreasonable”. If the 
commitment to judicial review has any meaning at all, it has to embrace the goal of 
correcting abuses of authority notwithstanding a general commitment to deference to 
administrative decisions.
In addition, I believe that when counsel can convince the reviewing court that 
the decision under review is based on a premise that is unquestionably incorrect, this 
also ought to render the decision “patently unreasonable”. This type of mistake does 
not imply bad faith on the part of the decision-maker, but the type of mistake I have 
in mind is one that cannot seriously be defended. For example, if a decision is based 
on the authority of a statute that has not been proclaimed into law or has been 
repealed, or on the authority of a judgment that has been overturned on appeal, it 
seems to me that the decision should not be allowed to stand regardless of the high 
degree of deference that would normally be accorded to the administrative body that 
made the decision. Let me offer the example of the case of Vernon (City) v. Vernon
Professional Fire Fighters Assn.11 which involved an arbitration in a dispute under 
what was at the time new legislation, the British Columbia Fire and Police Services 
Collective Bargaining Act.72 Unfortunately, the arbitrator based part of his decision 
on the wording of a section of the Bill introducing the Act, and this wording had been 
amended on Third Reading. Although Mr. Justice Brenner, as he then was, found that 
this mistake was not the arbitrator’s fault, he nevertheless concluded that although 
the decision would normally be entitled to a high degree of deference, the mistake 
rendered the decision “patently unreasonable” and it had to be overturned.
A third type of situation in which the Supreme Court of Canada has been pre­
pared to intervene using the “patently unreasonable” standard is when there are seri­
ous flaws in the logical underpinnings of the administrative body’s decisions. For 
example, it seems to me it is “patently unreasonable” for a tribunal to make factual 
findings where there is no evidence to support these findings, in the same way that it 
was traditionally considered to be a jurisdictional error for a tribunal to do so.73 In 
Toronto (City) Board o f Education v. O.S.S.T.F. District 15,14 the Supreme Court of 
Canada took this reasoning one step further and held that it was “patently unreason­
able” for a labour arbitration board to make factual findings that could not be rea­
sonably supported on the evidence before it. It is, of course, possible that this 
approach to the “patently unreasonable” standard could open the door to excessive 
judicial interference based on simple disagreement with the inferences drawn by the 
administrative body from the evidence before it. It seems to me, however, that it is 
better for judges to recognize this possibility and guard against it than it is to use the 
deference principle to immunize decisions that are not logically supportable from 
judicial review.
Another example of this type of reasoning can be found in Mr. Justice Binnie’s 
concurring judgment in Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister o f Health 
and Social Services).15 He found that the Minister’s decision to refuse to grant the 
hospital permit requested in the case “was “patently unreasonable” in terms of the 
public interest as [the Minister] and his predecessors had defined it over a period of 
seven years of consultation, encouragement and assurances to the respondents, and 
in his total lack of regard for the implications for the respondents of the Minister’s
1996 CarswellBC 1459 (B.C.S.C.)
72 S.B.C. 1995, c. 40.
73 See Skogman v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 93, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 161; Douglas Aircraft Co. o f Canada v. 
McConnell, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 245, at p. 277 (per Estey, J. dissenting in part); Keeprite Workers’ 
Independent Union v. Keeprite Products Ltd. (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 162 (Ont. C.A.).
74 Supra note 56. See also Canadian Union o f Public Employees v. Montreal (City), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 
793 at para. 85 and, more generally, Comtois, supra note 33, at pp. 133 - 135.
75 Supra note 13.
broken promises.”76 While Mr. Justice Binnie was not willing to give direct legal 
effect to the hospital’s reliance on those promises, the Minister’s failure to provide 
an adequate reason for his unwillingness to give effect to the assurances he and his 
predecessors had made to the hospital rendered his discretionary decision to refuse 
the permit “patently unreasonable”.
A fourth type of situation in which the Supreme Court of Canada has found 
that an administrative body’s decision was “patently unreasonable” is illustrated by 
the majority decision in the Lester case.77 Madam Justice McLachlin, as she then 
was, offered a number of reasons for concluding that the Newfoundland Labour 
Relations Board was acting in a “patently unreasonable” manner when it declared 
that a “double-breasting” construction company was a successor employer for pur­
poses of the Newfoundland Labour Relations Act.78 The most compelling of these 
reasons, in my own view,79 was that the Newfoundland Legislature had made a con­
scious decision not to introduce “common employer” legislation that would allow the 
Board to treat “double-breasting” construction companies as a single entity, and the 
Board’s interpretation of the Act’s successorship provisions effectively created a 
“common employer” rule.80 To put it another way, the majority concluded that the 
Board was not merely interpreting the legislation in question but was effectively 
seeking to amend it, something that only the Newfoundland Legislature could do. 
Thus an administrative body’s failure in a decision to observe the limits of its insti­
tutional role can be said to render that decision “patently unreasonable”.
A fifth, and somewhat more controversial, example of a type of decision that 
can be said to be “patently unreasonable” is one that is “inconsistent with the policy 
objectives of the statute”81 that is being administered. It seems to me that this 
approach to the “patently unreasonable” standard is the one that was, in effect, 
employed by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in C.U.P.E. v. Ontario 
(Minister o f Labour).*2 The majority decided that the Minister’s decision to appoint 
retired judges who were not experienced labour arbitrators as interest arbitrators
76 Ibid., at para. 64.
77 Supra note 56.
78 S.N. 1977, c. 64.
79 See P. Bryden, Case Comment (1992), 71 Can. Bar Rev. 580, at pp. 586-587.
80 See Lester, supra note 56, at [1990] 3 S.C.R. pp. 686-687.
si Canada Safeway Ltd. v. R.W.D.S.U. Local 454, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1079, at para. 65 (per Cory and 
McLachlin, JJ. writing for the majority) quoting Royal Oak Mines Inc. v. Canada (Labour Relations 
Board), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 369, at p. 403 (per Cory, J.). See also, Paccar, supra note 64, per Wilson and 
L’Heureux-Dubé, JJ. dissenting).
82 Supra note 13.
under the Ontario Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Acfi3 was “patently unrea­
sonable”. The key passage in the Mr. Justice Binnie’s reasons explaining the major­
ity’s conclusion is the following:
Speaking broadly, “the perspective” within which HLDAA was intended by the 
legislature to operate . . . is to secure industrial peace in hospitals and nursing 
homes. HLDAA imposes a compulsory yet mutually tolerable procedure (if prop­
erly administered) to resolve the differences between employers and employees 
without disrupting patient care. In that context, appointment of an inexpert and 
inexperienced chairperson who is not seen as broadly acceptable in the labour 
relations community is a defect in approach that is both immediate and obvious.
In my view, with respect, having regard to what I believe to be the legislative 
intent manifested in HLDAA, the Minister’s approach to the s. 6(5) appointments 
was patently unreasonable.84
It is immediately noticeable, however, that Mr. Justice Binnie describes the defect in 
the Minister’s reasoning as “immediate and obvious”, in order to reconcile his con­
clusions with the description Mr. Justice Iacobucci in Southam offered of the char­
acteristic of a “patently unreasonable” decision.
Mr. Justice Bastarache, writing in dissent, made what strikes me as a telling 
criticism of this approach:
Given how much work it takes even to identify the factors at issue in this appeal 
(labour relations experience and broad acceptability) and to imply them into s.
6(5) [of the HLRAA], I am reluctant to conclude that weighing them less heavi­
ly than another factor, also unwritten (judicial experience), vitiated the appoint­
ments as patently unreasonable. Using the language of Iacobucci J. in Southam, 
at para. 57, cited above, I would say that the Minister’s appointments were not 
patently unreasonable because “it takes some significant searching or testing to 
find the defect”, if there is one. More problematic for Binnie J.’s approach, in my 
view, is the fact that it takes “some significant searching” even to find the fac­
tors said to constrain the Minister. It is difficult to characterize the Minister’s 
appointments as immediately or obviously defective, particularly when the fac­
tors are not themselves immediately or obviously ascertainable. The flaw cannot 
be explained simply and easily. Or to draw on Cory J.’s approach in PSAC, 
supra, at pp. 963-64, it is difficult to argue that the appointments were “evident­
ly not in accordance with reason,” or “clearly irrational”. Turning to Ryan, when 
the compelling rationale for curial deference is borne in mind —  in particular the
83 R.S.O. 1990, c. H.14 [ “HLDAA”].
84 C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister o f Labour), supra note 13, at para. 184.
Minister’s superior expertise at labour relations —  it becomes difficult to say 
that the appointments are “so flawed that no amount of curial deference” could 
justify letting them stand. Returning, finally, to Suresh, a failure to consider the 
proper factors, even if I were to accept them as determinative, fails to vitiate the 
Minister’s decision because the factors themselves were not obvious and uncon- 
troversial. These are all different ways of expressing the conclusion that the 
appointments were not patently unreasonable.85
The difficulty I experience with Mr. Justice Bastarache’s observations is that, with 
the possible exception of the second type of example I set out above, it is a criticism 
that could fairly be leveled at all the other instances in which the Supreme Court of 
Canada has concluded that an administrative decision was “patently unreasonable”. 
It seems to me that, as illustrated by these decisions, there are many situations where 
the Supreme Court of Canada actually wants to encourage courts to use their judicial 
review powers to protect the interests of persons who are affected by administrative 
decisions notwithstanding a general commitment to deference. To limit intervention 
using the “patently unreasonable” standard to situations where a decision is “clearly 
irrational” or “immediately and obviously defective” is to offer an impoverished 
approach to judicial review that is, in my respectful opinion, inconsistent with the 
results of many of the Supreme Court of Canada’s actual decisions. As a matter of 
substantive labour relations law I happen to believe that the result reached by the 
majority of the Court in C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister o f Labour) is misguided, but I 
believe that it is more productive to address the underlying issues directly than it is 
to suggest that the Minister’s decision should stand because the defects in his rea­
soning are not sufficiently obvious.
The sixth and final example I will offer in my catalogue of judicial approach­
es to the question of what makes a decision “patently unreasonable” is the one pro­
vided by Mr. Justice Robertson in Doucet Jones. He observed that “if a decision­
maker arrives at an interpretation in a manner that is inconsistent with accepted prin­
ciples of interpretation, the interpretative decision is not rationally supported. The 
defect should be obvious and the decision must be declared patently unreasonable.”86 
Once again, this passage nods in the direction of the “lack of rational support” for the 
decision and the “obviousness of the defect” in order to bring the reasoning into line 
with the dominant stand of Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on what makes 
a decision “patently unreasonable”. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the concept that 
underpins Mr. Justice Robertson’s reasoning is not the thought that the court is 
reviewing the soundness of the decision-maker’s reasoning process, but the idea that 
the court has an obligation to ensure that the decision-maker is carrying out his or her
85 Ibid., at para. 36.
86 Doucet Jones, supra note 2, at para. 27.
duties in a manner that respects the limits of the mandate afforded to legal decision­
makers. Reasonable people may disagree about the result of an application of accept­
ed principles of interpretation. Nevertheless, failure on the part of a decision-maker 
to accept the discipline that accepted principles of interpretation impose on legal 
decision-making represents a threat to the rule of law. Decisions that have this char­
acter are “patently unreasonable” and courts will intervene to ensure that decision­
makers respect this aspect of the limited nature of their mandate.
Mr. Justice Robertson recognized that this approach could be misused. In the 
next paragraph of his reasons he noted that it would be overly simplistic to suggest 
“that all interpretative issues can be resolved easily through the uniform application 
of established principles and rules of construction.”87 If a reviewing court were to 
take this view, it would be “all too easy to declare that an administrative decision is 
or is not patently unreasonable and to explain why this is so in a manner that is no 
different had the proper review standard been correctness.”88 The solution to this 
dilemma is to recognize that there is a large body of interpretative jurisprudence that 
eliminates much of the subjectivity associated with the interpretation of a statute or 
contract. If we view a patently unreasonable interpretation as one in which there is a 
patent defect in the application of interpretative principles or rules of construction, it 
is not as difficult for the parties to predict whether a reviewing court will inter­
vene.”89
I have attempted in this part of the essay to sketch out a set of distinctions 
among the “correctness”, “reasonableness” and “patently unreasonable” standards of 
review that I believe to be workable in practice and that are consistent with at least 
some strands of the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence. I do not pretend that 
this discussion is by any means comprehensive, and my goal in this endeavour is to 
spur further discussion in this area rather than to attempt to have the last word. It 
seems to me, however, that this effort is more promising than continued reliance on 
a set of distinctions that, however admirable they may be in terms of flexibility, offer 
too little in the way of useful guidance.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I believe it is useful to return to the initial insights that led to the more 
sophisticated “pragmatic and functional” approach to substantive judicial review that 
is reflected in the Pushpanathan decision and its progeny. They are that administra­
tive bodies should not be entitled to be immune from judicial oversight in respect of
87 Ibid., at para. 28.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
any aspect of their decisions, and that at the same time there are many situations in 
which the people who are affected by those decisions would be better served if judi­
cial scrutiny is not excessively intense. For those insights to serve the interests of the 
Canadian public however, it is not enough for the courts to offer a principled account 
of the rationale for judicial deference. We need a workable description of the types 
of situations in which judicial intervention is appropriate as well.
I appreciate the fact that administrative law has to cover an enormous range of 
institutions and types of decisions and this puts a premium on flexibility.901 also rec­
ognize that our ability to draw distinctions ultimately rests on our choice of appro­
priate language and that we may be unable to capture all of the shades of meaning 
we would like to be able to using this tool.91 On the other hand, it seems to me that 
there are opportunities to refine our thinking on how to approach the different stan­
dards of review, and that further efforts along the lines I have suggested above would 
be productive not only for the courts but for administrative bodies and the persons 
who are affected by their decisions as well.
90 See Iacobucci, supra note 31.
91 See Mr. Justice Cory’s observations in Canada (Attorney General) v. Public Service Alliance of 
Canada quoted in the text, supra note 65.
